Jasmin Hasanovi nasceu em 1989 em Fo a, Bósnia e Herzegovina. É professor assistente na Faculdade de Ciências Políticas da Universidade de Sarajevo, instituição onde se licenciou e obteve o seu mestrado em Diplomacia e Relações Internacionais. A sua investigação foca-se nas áreas de relações internacionais e ciência política e encontra-se publicada em diversas revistas científicas nacionais e internacionais. É frequentemente orador convidado em diversas universidades. Participa também em ONG’s promovendo a cultura política entre os mais jovens e sendo ativista contra a corrupção na Bósnia-Herzegovina. Foi membro do projeto da ONU “Youth Forum Dialogue” e é editor da “Novi Plamen” (Nova Chama), uma revista de esquerda dirigida ao território da ex-Jugoslávia.

The conflict in the Balkans occurred, roughly, two decades ago. Do you think there are still scars from the war to be healed?

Of course, there are scars because nobody really wants to heal them. Healing would mean that the current ethnic elites and their policy would lose its legitimacy. So, to maintain in power, it’s the best option to use the legacy of war, trifling with the emotions and people’s feelings. Overproducing the war in the time of peace means revoking the imagined and constructed antagonisms among people by accusing others and building a demonic image on them to set themselves as national protectors, legitimating their governance, but also justifying the war – which was, primarily, mean of their rise.

Do you think Balkans are still in the past or are already preparing for the future?

Currently, they [ethnic elites] want to keep the post-Yugoslavian countries in the “eternal present”, and the strengthening retrograde narrative of the right within Europe goes in favour to this. It’s an “eternal present” linked to the past – that would be the best explanation. The intersection between temporality and space ends in a “status quo” which they need, the same as they need all those links with the war for (overproduction of ) the past. Any major change at this point, for better or for worse, would not be in favour for them. It is important that, so far, nothing changes, at the same time giving an impression that they seek for a change – which, rhetorically, stir up fears on a possible new war.

How do you think western countries see and perceive the culture and reality of Balkans?

I think they perceive [the reality] in the way it really is – but constructed by their own imagination. They just feel hard to accept not only the realities of the Balkans but from every “otherness” that is coming outside the geopolitical centre of liberal democracies. They’re imposing their own imagination(s) on Balkans and, within them, constructing their own reality and realities.

Balkans is a multitude of realities, religions, ethnicities and nationalities. Do you consider that western countries tend to generalize and look to the region as a whole?

Could be. But the West is also looking more in a cultural way like the way of “clashes of civilizations”, in a narrative that was intellectually broadly popular at the beginning of the 90’s. On the other side, the past, for instance, from the time of socialist Yugoslavia is being consciously ignored, believing that the reality of the Balkans starts from the bloody 90’s and that a possibility to live peacefully among each other in the past was never possible, that we were always in a conflict, as a bunch of primitives and animals fighting against each other.

Those imaginations at that time were also well popularized and established by writings like “The Burden of the Balkans” by Mary Durnham, “Historical Perspective: Yugoslavia a Legacy of Ethnic Hatred” by Jason Fields, or “The Fracture Zone: A Return to the Balkans” by Simon Winchester.

But, on the contrary, if we take a look at European history, we would see that the West had more wars than we. It is not incidentally that Europe is known as a “bloody continent”. And, also, if we consider the historical position of the Balkan countries, we would see that most of them, during the most time, were part of bigger empires or monarchies – like the Habsburgs, Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman…

Most of our people fought for those empires and their interests, a geopolitical game of big actors, we were “part of ” against each other and not by some kind of our natural will. Europe suppressed its memories towards the peripheral space of Balkans – the time “evil communist Yugoslavia”, whose elements of socialism were a blueprint to some European social policies, Swedish for instance, wanted to Europeanize – it balkanized – ending in hatred and wars.

Croatia and Slovenia were also part of Yugoslavia and are now members of EU. What are the main differences between these countries and the rest of Balkans that are still initiating the process to be part of EU?

Croatia and Slovenia try to build up their new national identities like they do not belong to the Balkans, and they never did. Balkans is not their, neither place or time like they were “accidentally” a part of Yugoslavia, and so on. With such an appearance, I think they’re also trying to deny all things that occurred in the past for which they are responsible as well.

And the overcoming the imaginary of the Balkans ends in other extreme absurdities. However, in Slovenia, there is still a strong sensibility to memories on Yugoslavia, while in Croatia, for instance, goes in a totally different way.

Croatia participated as a fascist collaborator during the II World War and the symbolism of that period, together with the leaders of the so-called “Independent State of Croatia”, are unfortunately practised by the current Croatian government – finding the legitimacy of the present Croatian national state in it – as a justification for the independence, Homeland war and anti-communist narrative.

EU will have a new commission next year. Are you afraid with the possibility of this enlargement process to the Balkans not be a priority to the new commission?

I’m not really sure that the Balkans have been a priority for the current EU so far, as well as the integration process as a whole. I think EU has much bigger problems currently, and the stories about the integration into the Union is something that is more symbolic than what could really happen.

And, if there is a real need to it, it will be because of some more important interests that are happening around: the need for widening markets after Brexit, to stop the migrants, to stop the Russian influence… I think we aren’t a priority as such, but we can become a priority if the Brussels administration sees so. At the present, the potential expansion of such an EU looks like an optimistic lie for both sides of the story.

EU points 2025 as a reference year for admission of Serbia and Montenegro. Is this an appropriate deadline? Is there the risk of demotivating Balkan countries with a distant deadline?

The process can last 4 or 10 years so I don’t think the date is the main issue.

Some of these countries have a majority of Muslim population. With the rise of populist movements across Europe, do you think this factor can have importance on the admission vote of some countries?

Of course, it can. But, there are in fact two related problems – both coming outside the Balkans. The first one is the rise of “radicalization” of Muslims, for which I would rather use the term “fundamentalism”. But also, the rise of the right in Europe is awakening and strengthening similar, anti-Muslim propaganda on the Balkans as well. It’s the same problem.

The Muslims as Muslims are not a problem, we’re looking only on the consequences, not on the real source of the problems. Europeans mostly have prejudices after meeting a, for example, Bosnian Muslim, believing you can’t have – sorry for speaking in those terms – a white European ethnical origin and being Muslim at the same time, believing being a Muslim is determined by having darker skin color, Semitic origin, coming from Asia or Africa…

And besides that, being a Muslim on the Balkans is not only a religious, but more a cultural thing. That is a problem Muslims in Bosnia are facing after the war because they are the target of various foreign groups who want to impose them a different understanding of Islam unlike what has been practised here through history.

Jihadists, for example?

For instance, it is hard to know. Muslims in Bosnia have a European origin, Islam came to us at one certain point in history. As being Slavic, we have preserved some of our Slavic traditions within our understanding of Islam. As well, we have connections with other religions, living and sharing many similar things with them, it is a small common space, so there is no place for Bosnian Muslims to be exclusive. But there is a visible rise of a reverse process. New religious groups, such as Salafists, are living in their own, separated villages, with different life customs, and different interpretations of Islam and religious practices from those of common, traditional Bosnian Muslims.

Kosovo is not recognized as an independent country for five EU members. Can we say that this issue needs to be solved before any enlargement of EU to the region?

So just take a note, as I’m not an expert on Serbia and Kosovo, and I cannot really be sure of everything my mind thinks or expects. To be honest, at most I believe it depends both of European interests towards Serbia, and Serbian towards the EU. Serbia with Vucic wants to become the regional leader, so there are a lot of tacit concessions. I think in part Serbia silently already recognized Kosovo.

But, I would like that the real problems Serbian and Kosovar people facing by being prisoners of nationalistic policies start being illuminated. Freedom of movement, privatization, evictions, unemployment, and criminal as a consequence… There are more things both sides shares.

Bosnia and Herzegovina don’t recognize Kosovo and this issue is a risk to the cohesion of the country. Do you think this can lead to the disintegration of Bosnia since sooner or later, within or not in the EU, Bosnia will need to take a position about Kosovo?

Well, so far it depends on Serbia. What Serbia do, Republika Srpska [an entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina] will do, and so Bosnia and Herzegovina. It’s the lack of political strength in the country as a whole. Serbia hasn’t done it, so Bosnia will not do it at this time.

But there is the risk of disintegration of Bosnia and Herzegovina?

I don’t think that’s a real scenario at this point, because the goal of Milorad Dodik [President of Republika Srpska] is to talk about a referendum on secession from Bosnia and Herzegovina as the possibility to give Republika Srpska the independence each time his political interests are in an unfavourable position.

But in case that really happens, that could take its legitimacy away – the illusion of a possible secession is the only thing he can offer to his voters, hiding all problems such as corruption, nepotism, unemployment, poor social services under the carpet. It is the same destiny with the policy of “third entity” [entity for Bosnian Croats, to separate from Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a community consisting of Bosniaks and Croats, so each ethnical group could have its own entity].

However, although serving mostly as a political legitimation for the current ethnic leaders, those narrations are raising very dangerous, flammable and destructive ideologies for the future that could be taken by their political offspring for more than that.

Be part of EU will imply a loss of identity from Balkan countries?

We are a European region without European Union. Historical, cultural, ethnical, linguistic, architectural, in anyway, we are not different than any other European country, sharing at the same time our particularities as every region in Europe. So, I think it’s just a stereotype on Balkans. There’s no loss of identity as identity is neither something static, so there is no difference among us.

Do you see the EU enlargement process to the Balkans as a “win-win” solution, both for EU and for the Balkans?

Not really, because we can consider the European Union as a revolutionary idea, but within the current European Union there can’t be a win-win situation. It’s only a win solution for the Brussels administration, for the banks, financial organizations, bureaucracy and the elites ruling the European Union. There’s no win solution for the other side, just look at Greece, look at Spain, look at your country. I don’t think that the countries on the periphery can get anything from a such, de-democratized European Union. There is no win with more austerity, more privatizations, more banks, more credits…

Don’t you think that Balkans are better within the EU than outside the EU?

I don’t think that situation in the EU is better. Maybe in countries like Germany, France, Austria, Sweden… I think there are just couple countries that benefit from such an EU, or maybe even only one. For the other countries, I wouldn’t be so sure. Just look at Greece.

How do you see the Balkans 20 years from now?

I can say talk regarding the future of the post-Yugoslav countries, and my imagination is going on the idea to overcome the current, in a more freer interpretation, I would dare to imagine of building our own union. In many cases, we are too similar, we are (inter)connected, and having all those little-mashed countries is just absurdity, they are the legacy of the national leaders who wanted to gain power after socialism, but obviously, it is visible their idea doesn’t work. I mean, those little countries we have are unsustainable, they just cannot afford to be countries at all. There is the belief of gathering all those countries, into something…

The separation of countries doesn’t mean to achieve any freedom, it only gave power to the elites using nationalism in the bloodiest way imaginable. Not only that we’ve shared history, we also have connections with each other, we have mixed marriages between Bosnians, Croats, Serbs, Montenegrins, Macedonians, Slovenians… If there is something unusual, unnatural on the Balkans, it is the lack of an idea to gather us together